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RESTRICTED 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MERCHANT MARINE 
TO 
NATIONAL POWER 
A lecture delivered by 
Commander George D. Synon, U. S. C. G. 
at the Naval War College 
September 12, 1949 
In considering the relation of the Merchant Marine to na­
tional power, it is perhaps automatic for members of the Armed 
Forces to regard a large fleet of commercial shipping as indis­
pensible to the security of the United States. This premise has 
been fundamental to American naval strategy ever since Mahan 
enunciated his concept of sea power toward the end of the last 
century. It is today a proposition that is widely supported by 
many outstanding figures who write and speak publicly on this 
subject. 
Here, at the War College, however, we must not fall into 
the error of accepting any dogma or doctrine simply because it 
has been demonstrated in the past to be sound or well-conceived. 
It is necessary, rather, constantly to re-appraise in the light of 
changing world conditions any and all of the strategic premises upon 
which our thinking may tend to become fixed. 
Especially is this so in the case of the Merchant Marine. 
In the United States, private industry has been unable to operate 
ocean shipping on any wide scale without financial assistance from 
the Government. We call this subsidy; and we justify the payment 
of subsidy on the ground that the Merchant Marine is essential to 
economic prosperity and for the national defense. Consequently, 
the support of a large fleet of commercial shipping has come to be 
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accepted in the United States as a proper function of government. 
This viewpoint is vigorously and sincerely supported by the great 
majority of individuals and organizations connected with the mari­
time industry. But there are many people who believe that an ex­
panded Merchant Marine may be contrary to the best interests of 
the United States at the present time. These · persons are, of 
course, in the minority, but their arguments deserve careful scrut­
iny at an institution such as the War College. One ·of the pur­
poses of this discussion is to present that contrary point of 
view. Many of you officers here may at some time in the future 
be called upon to make decisions touching on the Merchant Marine. 
You will be helped in arriving at these decisions by a knowledge 
not only of the many good arguments both for and against a
strong U. S. Merchant Marine, but also by those which may be 
frankly designed to influence public opinion. 
As an example of what I am talking about, let me recall to 
your mind the state of the American Merchant Marine prior to 
World War I and II. At the beginning of the first World War, 
we had very little ocean shipping. Other nations carried the major 
part of our foreign commerce. When we finally got into that War, 
we simply did not have the ships we needed. Our troops and the 
vast bulk of our munitions had to be transported overseas in the 
ships of our allies. In World War II, we were in somewhat better 
shape-particularly as to shipbuilding-but from the standpoint of 
available tonnage, we were as poorly prepared to wage global war 
in 1941 as we were in 1917. 
The backers of a strong Merchant Marine policy point to 
these two instances of unpreparedness as over-riding reason for us 
to support an expanded fleet of merchant shipping in the future. 
And yet, a pretty good case can be made out for the prop­
osition that if the United States had been supporting such a mer­
chant fleet, the Allies would probably have lost World War I and 
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could not have won World War IL I shall attempt to do so a little 
later in this discussion. 
In the meantime, however, let us take a brief glance at 
national power in its broadest sense, and determine, if we can, how 
merchant shipping, as a part of sea power, has contributed to the 
national greatness and prosperity of maritime states in the past. 
Against such a background, I shall attempt to relate merchant 
shipping to certain aspects of military strategy as it has historically 
been employed in the case of Great Britain, since that nation dis­
plays so many features that are strategically similar to our own. 
Then, turning. to the present, we may consider a number of factors 
brought about as a result of World War II which, in my opinion, 
require a revision in our traditional concept-to some degree of sea 
power-but more precisely, of the function of the Merchant Marine. 
These factors are intimately related to the economics of world trade, 
without some knowledge of which it is difficult to understand the 
shipping situation as it exists today. And finally, a few conclusions, 
which may be justified by prevailing world conditions and our 
strategic needs for the future. 
Character of National Power
The nations of the world have been broadly classified as con­
tinental and maritime powers. Many military historians agree 
that the character of a nation from this standpoint dictates the 
form of strategy that is best suited to it. The British, for ex­
ample, are a maritime people, and they have, with success, pursued 
a maritime strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, are a con­
tinental power, and their important military successes have been 
on land. Mind you, this is not to say that a single nation may 
not combine in itself certain elements of both sea and land power. 
It is simply that such influences as geography, natural resources, 
population, and so forth, serve to direct the interests of a people 
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primarily toward the land, or toward the sea. If these forces are 
recognized and understood, it is possible, in my opinion, to measure 
the dependence of a state upon overseas trade, and thus to de­
termine a maritime strategy best suited to preserve or increase 
the national power. 
If we examine the nations of Europe and Asia and arrange 
them according to their historical pattern as continental or mari­
time powers, we will observe one significant difference between the 
two groups. All of the maritime powers-save Great Britain­
seem at some time in their history to have risen to world leader­
ship as sea powers, and then to have passed into decline-never to 
recover sea power once it has been lost. Whether Great Britain is 
now moving toward the fringes of that pattern, it is as yet too 
soon to say. But not so the continental powers. The great land 
powers-Russia, France, Germany-have lost and have regained 
the dominant position in Europe on numerous occasions. Even 
during periods of decline, they possess their political significance 
-as an example, we have the case of Spain today-as opposed to
the almost complete loss of influence in world affairs suffered by
the small nations that border on the sea-of whom Portugal is
likewise a case in point.
The reason for this political phenomenon is, I believe, that 
continental powers retain the essential attributes of territory, ma­
terial resources, manpower-which cannot be taken from them­
whereas, a truly maritime power can compensate itself for the 
lack of these advantages only by remaining strong at sea, and sea 
power-for reasons that are not clear-does not renew itself. 
It seems fair to say, then, that if the independent nations of 
the world who are truly maritime in character are forced away 
from the sea-whether by economic competition they cannot meet, 
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or by political or military means, their influence in world affairs 
and, correspondingly, their capacity to defend their independence, 
will be markedly reduced. This is the situation confronting the 
smaller maritime powers today. 
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Power 
Now, what is the connection between merchant shipping and 
the rise and fall of maritime states? 
The Mediterranean basin is perhaps the most fruitful area 
for an investigation of this sort. It is the scene of the emergence 
of a succession of maritime powers throughout the span of re­
corded history. Morever, the course of warfare in Europe has 
been inseparably identified with sea power in the Mediterranean. 
Naval strength has been exerted in these narrow waters almost 
invariably in either of two forms: in the protection of maritime 
commerce or in the employment of naval and merchant ship types 
for the support of land armies. It is significant that the changes 
in weapons and methods of warfare that have taken place since 
many centuries before the birth of Christ have failed to alter the 
fundamental strategic factors that determine military success or 
failure in this critical area of the world. The advantages of in­
terior lines, mobility, and freedom of action that were enjoyed by 
the ancient powers who were able to control and use the sea lanes 
of the Mediterranean persist until this day. 
In 525 B. C., Cambyses, the King of Persia, invaded and 
subdued Egypt. Then he looked westward, toward Carthage, and 
sent his army overland-across the Libyan Desert-to conquer 
Carthage and add that nation to his empire. But the Phoenicians 
-blood brothers to the Carthaginians-who controlled the sea,
and whom Cambyses could neither coerce nor intimidate, refused
to help him with their ships. Without a fleet for the support of
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his troops, Cambyses could not surmount his supply problem across 
North Africa-and his army perished in the desert. Yet, in 1940, 
the British, under General Wavell, in one of the most remarkable 
military campaigns on record, moved across this same stretch of 
North African coast to destroy an Italian army of more than 200,-
000 men. But the British right flank rested firmly on the free use 
qf sea communications for the support of Wavell's tank columns 
and tactical air. 
Indeed, control of the Mediterranean littoral has traditionally 
been achieved and maintained by those· belligerents who have first 
made secure their communications by sea. Alexander the Great 
recognized as· hopeless any attempt to conquer Egypt until he had 
first disposed of the Phoenician navy which lay astride the supply 
routes of his land armies. So, as a first step, Alexander, unlike 
Cambyses, besieged Tyre, the principal Phoenician city, and re­
duced it after a campaign of seven months. But by this operation, 
Alexander removed the threat to his rear, and he obtained the cargo 
shipping without which he could not move against Egypt. Na­
poleon, on the other hand, did not percieve that sea power in the 
eastern Mediterranean was indispensable to the success of his armies 
on land. In his campaign to gain an eastern empire, Napoleon was 
turned back at Acre by an inferior Turkish force supported from 
seaward by a small squadron of British ships under Sir Sidney 
Smith. During the preceding year, as you will recall, Nelson had 
demolished the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile, and Napoleon 
was without the means to sustain his communications in the face 
of British command of the sea. This engagement marked the 
collapse of his dream of an empire in the East. After his defeat 
before Acre, Napoleon retired on his base in Egypt-baffled by 
his inability to use the sea. 
The principal states that have held maritime power in the 
Mediterranean are Phoenicia, Carthage, the Greek States, Rome, 
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Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. These States all have certain character­
istics in common. Taken as a whole, they may probably be said to 
comprise the identity of true maritime character. And it is well 
to bear in mind that we are examining a period of more than 2,500 
years. These States were invariably small in geographic extent. 
They lacked natural resources and arable land. They bordered 
on difficult terrain-mountains and deserts, or else the territory of 
unfriendly people!:!. The inhabitants of the maritime States were 
traders and craftsmen, rather than farmers or herdsmen. And 
these States depended on the importation by sea of foodstuffs and 
raw materials they were unable to produce at home. Like all other 
true maritime powers, they derived a large part of their national 
income from hauling the waterborne commerce of other nations 
not inclined toward the sea. But their greatest source of wealth and 
power grew out of their colonies, which they all sought to obtain 
and exploit. 
The earlier maritime powers of the Atlantic share these same 
characteristics-Portugal and Holland, for example. Great Brit­
ain falls into a somewhat special category, but only because of 
her insularity, which underlines both her dependence on the sea 
and the natural protection that it affords her. I would exclude 
France and Spain from such a grouping, despite their extensive 
maritime history, since they are primarily continental in charac­
ter. But it is proper to add to the list of early maritime states 
our own New England seaboard, as it existed from the beginning 
of the Nineteenth Century until the Civil War, as this region ex­
hibited so many of the features of maritime character. 
As you well know, pre-eminence at sea has been distin­
guished by the ownership of both combat and commercial fleets, 
but it is well to hold in mind that combat fleets have been sub­
ordinate in the order of national power to the commercial fleets 
7 
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they are designed to complement and to protect. The historian Gib­
bon clearly sums up this relationship in writing of Venice at the 
time of the Crusades: "Nor did she often forget that if armed gal­
leys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause 
and supply of her greatness." 
The decline of sea powers cannot always be ascribed to any 
immediate cause. In the history of nations that have risen to mari­
time greatness and have lost it, there are deep and slowly moving 
influences which I do not intend to examine here. But in the final 
stages of the decay of sea power, there is one clear sign for all to 
see: The merchant shipping of a declining sea power disappears 
from the seas by reason of enemy action or withers it at home 
through loss of profitable trade. 
The Military Strategy of Great Britain 
Let us now turn to Great Britain as the classic example of 
national greatness resulting from sea power. An understanding 
of the means Britain has employed to obtain and hold world power 
will assist us in applying correctly our own maritime strength in 
support of the national policy. It is not necessary to point out to 
this audience the similarities between our maritime position and 
that of Great Britain. It is, rather, the dissimilarities that must 
be emphasized. Among these, the most important is our lack of de­
pendence on the outside world for food. Of almost equal importance 
is the self-contained nature of our economy. This is not to infer 
that we do not draw from other parts of the world raw materials 
we do not produce in adequate quantities at home, or that the 
revenue we obtain from foreign trade does not form an important 
part of our national income. It is simply that our economy is not 
geared to a complex machinery of imports, exports, and all their 
related maritime enterprises-as is Great Britain's. It has truly 
been said that England must export or die. That statement could 
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not apply to us whatever. And a final difference to be stressed is 
that the United States-in addition to being a great sea power­
is also a great land power, despite Mahan's thesis that no nation 
could be both. 
Britain has applied sea power with a skill that surpasses 
all the other features of her foreign policy. King George V called 
England's Fleet her "sure shield", as indeed it has been. Not since 
William the Conqueror has Britain been invaded in war, although 
there have been periods when invasion seemed imminent. And, 
strange to say, there have always been Britons who feared invasion 
at times such as these and have urged the erection of all sorts of 
complicated land defenses to meet the enemy when he first stepped 
on shore. When Napoleon stood on the Boulogne coast, with an 
army of 130,000 men and a great assembly of transport and cargo 
craft to ferry it. across the Channel, the Admiralty itself was ap­
prehensive the invasion would succeed. But Lord St. Vincent­
under whom the immortal Nelson learned his trade-knowing full 
well the French would first have to dispose of the English Fleet 
that lay in the Channel, reassured the Admiralty in a classic re­
mark that seems worth repeating. "I do not say the French can­
not come", he said, "I only say they cannot come by sea." 
The strategy by which Britain has employed naval strength 
to advance and protect the interests of her commercial fleets is 
well known. Less widely recognized, perhaps, is somewhat the re­
verse of this circumstance: whereby merchant shipping has been 
a primary influence in shaping Britain's military strategy. In every 
war, as you know, the readiness of a weapon for use exerts a con­
trolling influence on the way the war is fought. In this sense, 
merchant shipping has served Britain as a weapon. 
The British have gained their most notable military suc­
cesses when they have been able to employ land armies of relat-
9 
9
Synon: The Relationship of the Merchant Marine to National Power
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
-- --·-- ------------- --···---····-- --- --------
RESTRICTED 
ively small size at critical points where control of the sea ap­
proaches could be assured. By this strategy, Britain has been able 
to minimize her lack of manpower and bring to bear against con­
tinental opponents inconvenient or distracting pressure on flank or 
rear, Such a strategy depends, of course, upon allies to engage the 
enemy frontally if the war is to be fought to a conclusion. But it 
has been the· pref erred policy of Britain not to engage in land war­
fare against a continental opponent unless assisted by a continental 
ally. Merchant ships have provided the means by which this ec­
centric form of strategy might be put to use. (And by eccentric, I 
mean displaced from the center, rather than queer or odd.) Relat­
ively small forces have been landed by transport and cargo shipping 
at points remote from the main theater but which the enemy is com­
pelled to def end if he is to remain secure all along his line. 
This eccentric form of warfare is ideally exemplified by 
Wellington's campaign in the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the na­
tions of Europe were allied with England against Napoleon, and 
the main theater of war was in mid-continent. Wellington used 
the Fleet to transport his army to Portugal, where he entered 
Europe, in the French rear. His army was relatively small but it 
imposed an annoying division of force upon the French. Wellington 
could not be ignored since he was stirring up so much trouble 
with the Spaniards. The attempt to dislodge him in a series of 
limited engagements was unsuccessful; and to have moved against 
him in force-which Napoleon would have been compelled to do­
meant transferring the main theater of war. In such a case, 
Wellington would either have retired behind his prepared posi­
tions at Torres Vedras or re-embarked his army into his trans­
ports. Thus Napoleon was confronted with what all continental 
soldiers seek to avoid: a war on two fronts. When Wellington felt 
that he was strong enough to move toward France, he used the 
Fleet to transfer his base by easy stages along the Spanish coast-
10 
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/2
RESTRICTED 
line. "If anyone", Wellington said, "wishes to know the history of 
this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me 
the power of maintaining my army, while the enemy are unable to 
do so." 
And yet, despite the maritime strategy that has been so well 
suited to British arms, there is a perverse streak in British military 
character which seeks the land battle of large proportions. Before 
the outbreak of the first World War, there was a clear schism in 
British military planning. The Admiralty group was all for em­
ploying the small British Expeditionary Force in the event of war 
in an eccentric move-an amphibious landing along the Pomer­
anian coast, in the German rear, or along the Belgian coast, at 
Ostend or Zebrtigge, on the flank. By this means, it was con­
tended, far more pressure would be taken off the French than if the 
British divisions were to take up a position on the left of the main 
French line. The opposing group in the War Office favored the em­
ployment of Britain's military effort in direct action against the 
principal German armies. Sir Henry Wilson, then Director of 
Military Operations, and an ardent Francophile, put over his plan 
to get the British army of six divisions into alignment with the 
French as soon after the outbreak of war as possible. 
Now, if the British have a defect in their military make­
up, it is their dogged persistence-once they are committed to a 
line of action-in following it out to the bitter end. "Maintaining 
the objective", they call it. The French recognize this. On one oc­
casion, Wilson inquired of General Foch what would be the smallest 
number of British troops that would be of any value to France in 
the event of a war with Germany. "Send us one British soldier", 
Foch replied, "and we shall take pains to see that he is killed !" 
The result was, that instead of the modest army of six di­
visions with which Britain had thought to assist France, she mobil-
11 
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ized three and a half million men, of whom 700,000 were killed-a 
disaster from which she has never recovered. 
The Dardanelles campaign was the only operation of major 
proportions undertaken by the Allies during World War I in which 
this eccentric strategy was employed. Its objective was to turn the 
left flank �f the Central Powers by knocking Turkey out of the war, 
and thus to obtain access to eastern Europe as a means for sustain­
ing Russia. Notwithstanding its failure and the criticism which 
has attended it, the Dardanelles campaign was soundly conceived. 
It was a proper and logical use of the mobility afforded by trans­
port type shipping to apply land pressure at a critical point the 
enemy could not readily def end. This operation failed not so much 
because of the brilliant defense put up by the German, Liman von 
Sanders, but primarily because the British were unable to support 
two offensives at the same time. Reinforcements that might have 
turned the tide at Gallipoli were withheld until after the Loos of­
fensive on the Western Front. 
Can we perceive in all this a lesson for the United States? 
Militarily, we possess the insular advantages of Great Britain but 
we possess also her corresponding disadvantage of limited man­
power in comparison with that of. our most likely continental ad­
versary. It is, of course, no part of my purpose to suggest for us 
any basic plan for war, but it seems plain, if Britain is to be 
taken as any sort of an example, that we cannot afford the head­
long employment of great masses of troops in land warfare against 
a continental opponent. If this be so, and I think it is, then we 
must-in the conservation of our national power-turn to an ec­
centric-a maritime form of strategy-and exploit the advantages 
of mobility, surprise, and economy of force that are conferred by 
sea power-at the heart of which is merchant type shipping. 
12 
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Political and Economic Considerations 
It was primary thesis of Admiral Mahan that for a nation 
to be a great sea power it must conform to three requirements: 
First, such a nation must have the means of production, and thus 
be stimulated to the exchange of products. Second, it must have 
shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on. And, third, it must 
own colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping. 
(Incidentally, our own lack of colonies led Mahan to question 
whether the United States could ever become truly great at sea.) 
Prior to World War II, this concept of sea power was well 
supported in the history of maritime nations. You will observe, 
however, that it is a concept that grows out of the colonial sys­
tem and the doctrine of mercantilism. In the period before World 
War I-in which Mahan wrote-the maritime powers were in con­
stant struggle for individual advancement, and all of them owned 
colonies. Under the system of mercantilism, a nation seeks to ob­
tain the materials needed to support its economy from within its 
own orbit and to export its production to others at a profit. Hence, 
each of the maritime states required its own fleet of merchant 
shipping, since none could depend upon its rivals to provide ships 
at a time when not to provide them would weaken the relative 
position of the other. 
Taken on the whole, this theory of sea power was certainly 
justified by world conditions prevailing until World War II. But, as 
a result of that War, there have been profound changes in the mili­
tary and economic workings of world politics which, in my opinion, 
cause us to revise our earlier ideas of what is, and what is not, in the 
national interest. The rise of international gangsterism and the to­
talitarian state has forced peace-loving nations to look toward col­
lective action as the best means of preserving their individual se­
curity. In World War II, we used lend-lease to support nations 
13 
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whose interests were tied up with our own. At the present time, we 
are endeavoring by means of E. C. A. to restore and sustain the 
economic structure of the free nations of Europe. We believe 
those nations must enjoy a reasonable degree of prosperity if they 
are to be strong enough to withstand penetration by forces or ideol­
ogies dangerous to ourselves. In order to do this, we are expending 
-and we are committed to expend-a vast portion of our national
substance. Nobody knows what this program ultimately may cost.
But it is a program, nonetheless, around which our entire foreign
policy is centered.
This is a philosophy of world politics to which we as a na­
tion have not heretofore subscribed. And it imposes upon us the 
necessity to review some of the assumptions wh.ich have been funda­
mental to our national thinking in the past. One of these is the as'." 
sumption that the ownership of a large merchant marine is a 
source of national power. Standing alone, this assumption is good,; 
but it fails to take into account other, more potent, factors upon 
which the national interest depends. As I see it, the question to be 
decided is whether national support of an expanded U. S. merchant 
fleet is in agreement with our larger policy of aid to Europe. If 
not, then we must find a policy for the Merchant Marine that tends 
to advance the program we are embarked upon in Europe at such 
great cost arid risk to ourselves. 
Since our immediate objectives in Europe are economic, let us 
give some attention to the economics of world shipping. 
It so happens that most of the nations to whom we are ex'." 
tending assistance are maritime powers-Norway, Britain, The 
Netherlands, and Greece, for example. Or else they have large 
maritime interests, such as France and Italy. The life of these na.: 
tions to great extent depends on the sea. Before World War II, they 
14 
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shared-if we exclud� Japan---,-the.bulk of the carrying trade of the 
world. The. transportation of ocean commerce is one of the prin­
cipal services they sell to others. These countries haul freight 
cheaply and efficiently. Moreover, they must have the income they 
derive from this service if they are to maintain economic stability. 
It affords their peoples a means of livelihood and provides them with 
foreign exchange to buy the food and materials they cannot produce 
at home. Today, the shipyards of Europe are striving to replace the 
tonnage lost during the War, although the United States can sup­
ply enough shipping for all the world's needs. These nations realize 
intuitively they cannot turn their backs on the sea. 
With this background, we may return to the proposition ad­
vanced earlier in this discussion, namely, that the existence of a 
large U.S. Merchant Marine would have jeopardized Allied chances 
of winning World Wars I and II. 
First, let us recognize that the total demands of world trade 
will support a corresponding amount of world shipping. In other 
words, the more trade, the more shipping in active employment. 
But existing tonnage in excess of these requirements will either be 
operated at a loss, or it will remain idle, since there will not be 
enough trade to go round. Thus, at any given time, there is a pool 
of world shipping that provides the means of ocean transportation 
for world commerce. If the principles of economics are allowed to 
operate freely, the size of this pool will be determined by the law 
of supply and demand. Some nations will hold more of this shipping, 
and others will hold less, depending upon their ability to compete in 
the various world trades. 
This was essentially the system that prevaiied prior to World 
War I and II. Foreigners could operate ocean shipping more cheap­
ly than we could; consequently, they carried the greater part of our 
trade. 
15 
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Now, what happens when you tinker with this system? 
What would have been the effect if, a few years prior to World War 
I or II, we had, by means of subsidy, put an expanded U. S. mer­
chant fleet into the pool of world shipping? The result, as you can 
very well see, would have been to force certain of the other carrier 
nations to cut down their merchant fleets to the level the remaining 
trade would accommodate. 
It is not hard to see which nations these would have been. 
They would have been those nations whose costs of operation most 
nearly approached our own-which means Britain, since she has less 
of a margin, or cushion, to absorb the pressure of uneconomic com­
petition from us. It is, of course, quite true that Britain's world­
wide interests would have preserved for her a substantial merchant 
fleet-still the largest in the world-but, nevertheless, competition 
of the magnitude we are considering here would seriously have cut 
into the tonnage that was available to Britain at the outbreak of both 
World Wars. 
There is good reason to believe the German U-Boat cam­
paigns against British shipping in both World War I and II very 
nearly succeeded. If the results of the first U-Boat campaign in 
World War I be examined-and there were two separate campaigns 
in that War-it will be observed that the British barely managed 
to survive. With a smaller merchant fleet, there seems no doubt 
Britain would have been starved into submission. The United 
States was doing its best to remain neutral-not sending its ships 
into the war zone, and so forth-but we had ocean freight backed 
up on every railroad siding as far west as Chicago. The pressure 
was on to do something for the Allies, and to get that freight mov­
ing. 
A larger U. S. Merchant Marine would have alleviated this 
situation, and we would have been able to send our industrial and 
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agricultural production throughout the rest of the world. Likewise, 
a larger U.S. merchant tonnage would have increased the potential 
hazard to Germany if the United States were drawn into the War; 
and, with the correspondingly better prospects of success of its 
U-Boat campaign against Britain, it seems quite likely the German
High Command would not have initiated the policy of indiscriminate
sinking that finally did bring us into the War.
The situation was very much the same in World War II. 
Although Britain had a greater tonnage, she had military commit­
ments that required merchant shipping on a far wider scale. Cargo 
bottoms were a critical shortage for Britain throughout the War. Ac­
cording to the British White Paper of November, 1944, Britain 
started World War II with 17,500,000 gross tons of merchant ship­
ping under her control. By the end of 1943, she had lost the as­
tounding total of nearly twelve million gross ,tons! 
It is not necessary for us to dwell on the probable results of 
the elimination of Great Britain as an opponent to Germany in either 
World War I or II. And I am well aware that the circumstances 
which I have outlined and which might have forced her withdrawal 
are entirely conjectural. But my point is this-we must not accept 
blindly the statement that a large Merchant Marine is for the 
United States an unfailing source of national power. 
We share with Britain leadership in a world complex of sea 
power that rings the continents of Europe and Asia like a girdle. 
The members of that complex are mutually supporting. This align­
ment of maritime strength provides individual states in the mari­
time community with what is probably their most valuable single 
means to withstand domination by land power. A proper policy for 
the Merchant Marine will tend to preserve this alignment upon 
which the maritime position of the United States ultimately depends. 
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How can we go about doing this? 
First, I should say we must estimate, as best we can, what 
will be our requirements for merchant type shipping in the event of 
war-not only for ourselves, but also for our prospective allies. 
Then we must determine how these requirements may be satis­
fied without adversely affecting our other vital interests not direct­
ly related to shipping. 
Allied needs for merchant shipping in time of war arrange 
themselves naturally into two categories: the short-term needs 
and the long-term needs. The pool of world shipping is one of the 
principal sources from which this tonnage may be obtained-just 
as it was in the last War and the War before that. Merchant ships 
lose much of their nationality in time of war. Officers here can re­
call convoys in the last War in which the flags of half a dozen 
Allied nations were flown. In World War II, the merchant tonnage 
available to all the Allies was drawn upon as a common fund­
centrally disposed of and centrally directed. We may expect some 
such procedure to be adopted in any future war. 
If we define our short-term needs as those during the first 
six months of a war, it will be safe to say they can be adequately 
provided for from three already existing sources: (1) the tonnage 
controlled by our prospective allies and friendly neutrals, (2) the re­
serve fleets, which we must keep up-to-date and in good order, and 
(3) the active U. S. Merchant Marine.
I will not touch further on the first two of these sources. 
Nor will I discuss the merchant type tonnage available in the Mili­
tary Sea Transport Service. But, as to the third of these sources of 
short-term shipping, it is my opinion that we can maintain under 
our Flag a fleet of merchant shipping which will take its proper place 
in the world complex of maritime power-without weakening any 
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of its members-and still give us a good nucleus for expansion in 
time of war. 
Briefly stated, such a fleet may be built around three pri­
mary peacetime demands for shipping in the United States : 
(1) Domestic shipping. Coastal and intercoastal shipping is flat on
its back. It has never returned to the level of activity it en­
joyed prior to World Wars I and II. It must be restored if our
maritime potential is to be maintained. I would urge the extension
of subsidy or some other form of government assistance to this
type of shipping if for no other reason than it is an invaluable
source of seamen and of the miscellaneous smaller auxiliary craft
always so badly needed upon the outbreak of war. (2) The tonnage
we must operate on certain ocean routes to guarantee a continuing
supply of materials we do not produce at home-manganese, bauxite,
tin, and other minerals,-coffee and sugar, if you like. (3) The
tanker fleet. This, gentlemen, would be a considerable merchant
marine. It would by no means put us out of the shipping business,
and it would avoid cutting into the economic substance of our friends
in Europe.
Our long-term requirements for merchant type shipping are 
more difficult to estimate. They will of course, be dictated by the 
nature of the war on the military front and by the rate and de­
gree of mobilization of all our other resources. Thus, it is clear we 
will be granted time-within limits-to produce the additional ship­
ping we may need, as our economy and manpower are more widely 
mobilized. No one can say with certainty what our shipping re­
quirements will be in the event of a long war, just as no one can 
say where we shall be compelled to hold and where we may be able 
to go forward, but it is prudent to assume that military operations 
widely separated on the continents of Europe and Asia will have 
to be supported, as will our own civilian economy and the civilian 
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populations of certain of our allies. This bloc of shipping may sur­
pass in tonnage all the Allied shipping of World War II. 
But whatever these requirements may be, it must be em­
phasized that we cannot hope to satisfy them unless we preserve 
the shipbuilding industry in the United States. The know-how of 
building ships is indispensable to sea power. It is at once an art 
and a science, acquired patiently and painstakingly by those who 
practice it. A competent force of designers and technicians upon 
whom the industry may expand must be maintained in peace, if 
the demands of war are to be met. In my opinion, a peacetime 
Merchant Marine of the order I have described-coupled with our 
naval building, the maintenance of the reserve fleets, and certainly 
a program of "prototype-ship" construction-will provide us with 
such a force and serve to keep the shipbuilding industry in a 
healthy condition. 
Gentlemen, I have by no means given you the entire picture 
of the Merchant Marine. The Department of Logistics will under­
take a detailed study of many aspects of this subject I have simply 
touched upon; and Strategy & Tactics students will be afforded a 
resume' of that study later in the year. 
What I have tried to do here today is simply to give you 
an insight into the relation between merchant shipping and national 
power as it has existed in the past, and to provide, if possible, some 
basis of policy for the treatment of other, smaller, maritime powers 
upon whose continued well-being our own best interests depend. 
With much of what I have said, you may not agree. In­
deed, I should expect you to question critically many of the argu­
ments I have put forward. But, as you spend more time here at the 
War College, you will find-as I have-that one of its chief ob­
jectives is to encourage you to think things out for yourself. 
That is also the purpose of these remarks. 
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